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During the 1860s and 1870s there arose in Russia an influential public pressure group which proposed its own reading of the Russia empire. This group envisaged the empire renewing its national identity through the sponsorship of nation-building among the Orthodox and Slav peoples of eastern and central Europe, leading a crusade on the Ottoman and Habsburg empires on behalf of these peoples.
Panslavism was a response to the post-Crimean dilemma of the Russian empire, and in 1867 at an ethnographic exhibition the imperial nationalist and leading newspaper editor, Katkov, urged on Russia the role played by Prussia in Germany, bringing together the Slavs as a single state. He asserted that such a campaign "would complete the triumph of the principle of nationality and provide a solid foundation for the contemporary equilibrium of Europe." 32 Not all those Slavs present would unquestioningly accept Russian hegemony over their national life. For instance, Palacky and Rieger, the principle Czech spokesmen called for a reconciliation between Poland and Russia in which both Poles and Russians would make concessions. However, the Russians were adamant that since 1815 they had made every possible attempt to give Poland its own national life and its own state, but they had met with rebellion, ingratitude and attempts to annex Russian population and territory.33 One of the inescapable dilemmas of Panslavism was highlighted by these exchanges - that principal elements of its programme were rejected by those whom it purported to serve, and they did not wish to be part of a Russian empire in which there was no guarantee of democracy prevailing.
With the formation of the German empire in 1871 Panslavism became a means of containing Germany's expanding influence in central and eastern Europe. However, Panslavism could never be espoused consistently by the Russian government because it was a policy which inevitably would lead to war against the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, if not the European powers generally. It was in any case a revolutionary strategy in essence, directed against legitimate sovereign states. Panslavism represented an attempt to bring closer together the people and empire in Russia through an aggressive, nationally oriented, semi-democratic foreign policy in the image of German unification. It was poorly suited to a multi-national empire which feared democracy, ethnic conflict and war, it never became official policy for this reason.
In 1908 the European nations faced a grave Balkans crisis - the Croats, Greeks, Bosnians, Serbs, Slovenes and Bulgarians were all vying to realise their inflated nationalist cravings at the expense of someone else. Following Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 a particularly violent European crisis was provoked, but an open conflict was avoided for the time. Although Serbia resented the final incorporation of a territory which had a predominantly Serbian population into the Austro-Hungarian empire, even she eventually accepted the accomplished fact. In March 1909 Serbia admitted her rights had not been affected and even promised, in a spirit of neighbourliness, to change her policy towards the Habsburg monarchy. In this, as Halecki observes, she had little choice since at the time Russia was not prepared to go to war, although Serbia was aware that Russia was as resentful as herself over the matter.34 More than ever Serbia regarded Russia as her only friend and protector in central-eastern Europe. However, the lasting tension which was a consequence of the annexation crisis did not cause the Slavic peoples of Europe to align themselves against the Habsburg monarchy, which was supported by Germany.
In 1911 Serbia and Bulgaria, newly independent, discussed creating an alliance much like the loose Triple Entente that joined France with England and Russia, and the Triple Alliance that linked Germany, Italy and Austria. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, was delighted, believing that such an alliance would guard the Balkans, barring both Austrian invasion and German penetration. By the spring of 1912 Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia had concluded an alliance.35 However, Sazonov's attempts to direct affairs in the Balkans foundered and in the summer of 1912 an Albanian uprising against the Turks provoked a series of massacres and vicious reprisals. Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire on October 8, 1912 and on October 17 the Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian armies followed Montenegro into battle.36 The Great Powers proved to have no control over the situation and they found themselves hard-pressed to confine the conflict to the Balkans.
Eventually, after further fighting, a 'perpetual peace' was signed on May 30, 1913 with the Turks ceding their remaining European territories to the Balkan allies.37 Less than a month after signing the 'perpetual peace' the Bulgarian armies attacked Greece and Serbia and within a week the Greeks and Serbs had been joined by the Rumanians, with the Turks entering the fray in an attempt to recapture Adrianople. However, a peace conference was convened at Bucharest within a month and Bulgaria was stripped of her gains from the war against Turkey. Unfortunately the matter could not rest there. Bulgaria was certain to attempt to regain territories she had lost, and Serbia continued to make determined efforts towards the establishment of a 'greater Serbia' she had long envisioned.
The only hope of preserving order in the Balkans lay in Austro-Russian collaboration. The Balkan states could exploit the rivalry between the two empires for their own ends, and the fear that their Balkan clients would go over to the enemy camp unless they were humoured, greatly weakened the ability of either Russia or Austria to impose restraint in times of crisis. It was also unfortunate that the rulers of the two empires became less willing to demand restraint and risk alienating their Balkan clients as the conflicts between the two grew sharper because, in both Petersburg and Vienna, the military support of these clients was reckoned to be of crucial importance. The vulnerability of the Balkan governments to internal nationalist pressures - which often had strong support from the officer corps of the state and secret terrorist organisations such as the Black Hand (which was linked closely to the national army) - and the insecurity of the Balkan governments added to the instability in the Balkans.
The enthusiastic identification of Russia's interests with the Serb national cause, and the semi-imaginary 'Slav idea' on the part of Russia's representative in Serbia during the pre-War years, was only an extreme manifestation of the general fear of Austrian ambitions which informed Russia's foreign policy between 1909 and 1914.
In Serbia an ardent nationalist sentiment had led to the founding of various political organisations wanting to achieve the 'greater Serbia' so many dreamed about. The organisation called the Black Hand had sworn to fight all Serbia's enemies, and in an attempt to show the world the hatred they felt for Austrians they decided to assassinate Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Ironically the Archduke was widely considered the best champion of South Slav rights within the Habsburg monarchy, but this did not deter his assassins. Although the Hungarians had disliked the Archduke they were overcome by a blind hatred for Serbia, and the general view was that Serbia should be crushed by Austria. Ominously the Austrian Chief of Staff had long been an advocate of a war with Serbia, and he considered both the Balkan Wars and the Bosnian annexation crisis as missed opportunities. Matters were worsened by the Kaiser giving Austria Germany's full support to revenge the assassination, issuing a 'blank cheque' to allow Austria an almost unrestrained freedom to settle the issue with the Serbs.39
Sir Edward Grey believed that the Habsburgs, although justifiably outraged, would handle the situation in such a way that Europe need not get involved in the consequences. However, Grey had reckoned without the virulent nationalism that had long since been a feature of the high command in Austria. The Kaiser went so far as to say that "if matters went to the length of a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia", Germany would stand at Austria's side.40 As soon as Sazonov heard of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia over the assassination he realised that it meant a European War was now imminent, and within thirty-six hours Nicholas had declared that Russia must support Serbia.41 As Lincoln observes, in a sense Russia was giving Serbia a cheque as blank as the one Germany issued to
Austria.42
Russia's support of Serbia had less to do with any interest in Serbian nationalism and more to do with her fear of losing her prestige among Orthodox and Slav peoples, according to Halecki.43 Among these peoples influence was a valuable instrument of Russian imperialistic policy. Such a policy, clearly associated with aggressive Russian nationalism had very little appeal for smaller peoples, even Slavic peoples, who were in the neighbourhood of the Russian empire, or for the non-Russian nationalities within the empire's boundaries. In Europe in 1914 the grouping of forces was very largely determined by national issues, and the War soon proved that the national factor was even more important that had been anticipated hitherto. Considerations of the balance of power had chiefly dictated the system on which the original structure had been elaborated.
(This essay has been written by Michèle Fry, 2000 and it is copyright.)
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Towards World War One
In the eleven months that intervened between the guns in the Balkans being silenced and the renewed firing on Europe's Western and Eastern Fronts in August 1914, the incident that stirred the greatest bitterness and provoked the deepest suspicion, was the German military mission sent to Turkey at the end of the Second Balkan War. As Lincoln notes, a large-scale (forty-two military aides) German intervention in Turkey's affairs was bound to provoke a strong response from Russia at a time when better relations between Germany and Russia were needed to strengthen the unstable peace in Europe.38 In a similar manner to Izvolsky regarding Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sazonov was badly affected by this crisis in foreign affairs. Like any Russian statesman, Sazonov could not tolerate such an obvious move by Germany into a region long believed to be vital to Russian national interests. In the spring of 1914 a bitter war of words was unleashed by the national presses in the two countries, revealing further the deep-seated bitterness that existed between Germany and Russia. By mid-June 1914 the war of words had reached fever-pitch and only a fortnight later the Sarajevan tragedy that sparked World War One brought the tensions of affairs in Europe to its head.Conclusion
Whilst it is true that the frequently excessive nationalism of the relatively small peoples of central-eastern Europe had its own associated evils, it is also true that whatever their diplomatic rivalries amongst themselves and whatever their mistakes, it was not their nationalism which was responsible for the end of the relative peace Europe had enjoyed until 1914. Rather it was great power imperialism in combination with the nationalism of the ruling nations in two of the empires which, after so many other precariously appeased crises, intensified the crisis which followed the Sarajevo murders to such an extent that a local conflict between one of the small national states and one of the empires escalated into a World War.44 The fifty years prior to 1914 were a classic era of xenophobia and nationalist reaction to it because - leaving aside global colonialism - it was an era of massive migration and, particularly during the decades of Depression, of social tension, both concealed and open. The xenophobia consequent on such mass migration did not only come from below. The crisis of bourgeois liberalism was reflected in the xenophobia and nationalism manifested by the established middle classes.45 The national question was not only the immediate cause of the First World War, it is notable that it was the conviction that government by Serbs was the only proper government for Serbs, rather than indignation at ill treatment of Bosnian minority nationalities that was the motive for the Sarajevo murders.46
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