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At this time the German Empire was the second most powerful conservative force in the world after Tsarist Russia. I propose, therefore, to study the causative effects of nationalism in Russia with regard to the origins and outbreak of the First World War. In particular, this Independent Study will look at Russian anti-Semitism, autocratic Xenophobia, the forced Russification of non-Russians, and the interest in the principles of self-determination which actuated the Russian leaders during the period 1904-1914. It is my belief that what held true in the German Empire, as already stated by Geiss, also held true in Tsarist Russia.
"a belief that the shared characteristics of the nation are valuable and need to be preserved, and that in order to achieve that the national community has a legitimate right to form a separate political state, independent from other perceived nations, in which the nation or the people are sovereign." 2
He goes on to say that nationalism is more than the mere sentiment of loyalty to the nation to which an individual belongs - that is patriotism. Nationalism includes the belief that an individual's nation has a greater value and higher calling than other nations. Nationalism also supports the belief that in order to raise the worldly rank or status, and to increase the prestige and glory of the nation, any perceived enemies or threats to the nation need to be defeated, destroyed or eliminated - whether they are agents of foreign domination, internal oppressors or merely other rival nations.3
Woolf says that nationalism was born in the region where sovereign states had developed most strongly since the middle ages, that is, in Western Europe - specifically modern nationalism is dated from the French Revolution by convention, since the revolutionaries immediately and unequivocally equated language, state, nation and territory.
4 For nearly a century from the late eighteenth century nationalism was tied up with liberalism because the two combined the realisation of the innate dreams of particular peoples with progress. Liberalism and nationalism were associated largely because those states which were anti-national were also anti-liberal. Thus Great Britain and France regarded liberal reforms as an effective way of preventing revolution, and to the locals who promoted progress, liberal reforms without political independence - whether from territorial fragmentation as in Germany, or from the foreigner as in Italy - appeared increasingly impossible. In its first phase, therefore, nationalism was associated with liberalism because both ideologies were identified with middle-class values and with progress, and in France and England the national benefits of both were evident.
However, the 1848 revolutions clearly demonstrated that nationalism and liberalism were not two faces of the same coin, leading to self-doubt and self-questioning in both Germany and Italy by liberals, who wondered whether national independence actually was a necessary prerequisite for the furtherance of progress and liberal reforms. By the late nineteenth century, therefore, liberalism no longer had a privileged relationship with nationalism, not least because it had lost its monopolistic claim to embody progress owing to the influence of socialism.
During the nineteenth century nationalism was also linked to imperialism - to a certain extent imperialism can be considered nothing more than an extension of the competition between nations. During nationalism's popular phase, when any nation was largely defined in opposition to other nations, and in which national rivalries were being intensified, the acquisition of an overseas empire was frequently seen as a necessity to demonstrate the nation's grandeur. For many imperialism was a way of strengthening support for the nation and shifting focus from internal problems to ones far from home. The need to bring civilisation to the world could also be fulfilled through the establishment of colonies overseas. For many European nations, the growing sense of national identity they felt meant that the civilisation being exported was largely a national one. Thus whilst the purely military and economic arguments leading to imperialism are strong, their increasing sense of nationalism, their rivalry and competition with other nations and their desire to bring glory to their nation were partially responsible for the fact that European nation-states embarked on vast projects of imperial expansion.5 Nationalism cannot be said to be the sole or principle motivating factor behind imperial expansion - such an assertion would be an exaggeration - but it is undeniable that nationalism added to the other arguments in favour of imperialism.
Between 1850 and 1918 the key dilemma facing any empire was how to hold together problems of power, extensive territory, and large populations, on the one hand, whilst satisfying the demands of democracy, economic dynamism and nationalism on the other. The nineteenth century was the age of nationalism, with the 1860s and 1870s witnessing the Italian and German unification. P B Struve, leading member of the Union of Liberation and deputy in the second Duma, drew from German and English history an overwhelming message about "the strength of a state which puts the national idea into its service." 6 It was believed that the national idea, that is the idea of separate nationhood, would persuade a community to pay for its own peacetime armies and, more importantly, would sustain the community through the strains and stresses of a war, which Struve regarded as "the most evident, the clearest and the most irrefutable manifestation of the mystical nature of the state." 7 In both the 1905 Russo-Japanese War and in the First World War the top Russian military commanders stressed the relative lack of nationalist commitment amongst their soldiers as a cause of failure; for example, General N. N. Yanushkevich stated in 1915 that "it is beautiful to fight for Russia, but the masses do not understand it."
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In 1914 Struve defined Russia as a 'nation state-empire' betraying, as Lieven notes, in this tortuous definition the difficulties of separating and classifying the different sections of the imperial policy.9 Russians, argued Struve, were themselves a consolidated nation built through the numerous tribes which had been assimilated. They had subsequently conquered many alien elements, some of which were still politically controlled, whilst others had been fully assimilated. Struve's strongest criticism was reserved for Ukrainian nationalists who were, in his opinion, threatening the unity of the Russian nation state-empire's cultural and ethnic core.
The biggest dilemma faced by the Russian empire was that the best responses to external and internal challenges resulted in an empire being pulled in opposite directions. Internally cultural autonomy, agreed power sharing between communities, mutual vetoes and maximum decentralisation were not only the most civilised and humane policies, but also those likeliest to limit inter-ethnic conflict in the long run. However, such policies were hardly the best ones to maximise the state's fiscal and military resources in the face of external challenges to its existence. Yet the alternative centralising, homogenising trend that was pursued by the Russian and Hungarian governments was not only less humane, it was also less successful. In this era there was, unfortunately, a clear geopolitical logic to attempting to make identity and territory coincide: given the power of nationalism, such a policy's success would clearly contribute to the might of an empire, just as a failure would increase an empire's vulnerability. Throughout Europe nationalism was becoming an increasingly powerful force, affecting the foreign and domestic policies of many of the European empires and nation states, and causing a great deal of damage in the process as governments tried to control and direct its power.
National feeling among the populations of the great powers - or what was claimed to be national feeling in the first age of mass newspapers - was a potentially disturbing force. In Europe nationalism was becoming an increasingly potent force so that by July 1914 many Austrians saw war as possibly the only way to save their empire from the ethnic forces at work within the empire, as well as the enemies outside it. The ambitions of the great powers were also being intensified and sharpened by nationalism, with these ambitions taking their most explosive forms in Russia and Germany. As Bartlett points out, in both these countries, conservative leaders were watching with apprehension the rise of socialism and other 'dark forces', even as they tried to ensure that their empires would be among the select few that would dominate the approaching century.10 Russia's major setbacks in the war with Japan were a temptation to Germany, not least to attempt to establish closer links with St Petersburg. The Kaiser persuaded the Tsar to sign a draft agreement in 1905 under which both powers would aid the other if attacked by a third European power. However, once the Russian ministers were aware of the agreement they insisted nothing should be done to strengthen Germany. Russia needed to retain her French links if there was to be any sort of balance of power. Nicholas II pleaded for a compromise but early in 1906 his agreement was buried when the French insisted on Russia's backing against Germany in the conference that was called to discuss the Moroccan question. As Russia was dependent on French loans, she was obliged to agree.
According to Bartlett, Germany was not solely to blame for the changes in her prospects; for instance, Germany was not the prime cause of the Anglo-French entente's formation in 1904, although Germany subsequently strengthened it by her conduct in 1905-6, and similarly her actions then were only a partial cause of the Anglo-Russian entente. This entente owed more to Russia's defeat at Japan's hands in 1904-5, and the consequent Russian Revolution.11 Bartlett also defends Germany's role in the initial breakdown of the Austro-Russian entente in 1908, since Germany's relations with Russia were not injured until Berlin's heavy-handed intervention in 1909 persuaded the Russians that the issue had to be settled in Austria's favour.12
Bartlett blames the 1908-9 crisis with Austria and Germany, on the part of Russia at least, primarily on the personal ambition and impatience of Izvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, and his attempt to pull off an old-fashioned diplomatic coup.13 Izvolsky proved a poor choice for the role of Russian Foreign Minister as he demonstrated when he and the Austrian Foreign Minister, Aehrenthal, attempted a deal which allowed Austria to annexe Bosnia-Herzegovina. It seems likely, however, that the two did nothing more than hasten the demise of the 1897 Austro-Russian entente, which was already coming under threat from the intensification of nationalist feeling in Russia and the Balkans. The Russian Slavophils backed Serbia's claims for compensation for Austria's gains, but the Austrians, sure of German backing for their actions, refused to yield an inch to the Serbs. In March 1909 the Russians looked to Berlin for help to devise a line of retreat but instead received a blunt and imperious demand (what amounted to a veiled ultimatum) to abandon the Serbs.
In Russia the Tsar and his ministers were determined to restore their country to the ranks of the first-rate great powers as soon as possible, which required rebuilt and modernised armies, as well as a major naval construction programme. In the short-term Russia needed forces which, alongside the French forces, would ensure Germany's containment. As Bartlett observes, it was unfortunate that the more the Russians tried to attain this objective, so the Germans became more determined than ever to fight to preserve and increase their advantage whilst time was still on their side.14 However the fact that Russia was determined to return to more than the status quo as it was before 1904, did not help the situation. Russia, as a weaker power, had to suffer set-backs at the hands of the Central Powers in south-east Europe. These humiliations and defeats increased the influence of Russian nationalist groups, although such groups never became as formidable as their German counter-parts.
Aside from Germany's angst and ambition, the most serious threat to peace in Europe lay in the Near East and the Balkans where nationalist turbulence ensured that the three great powers were unable to re-establish one or other of the varied forms of co-existence which had, on previous occasions, tempered their relations since 1815.
(This essay has been written by Michèle Fry, 2000 and it is copyright.)
http://www.sassoonery.demon.co.uk/nationalism1.htm
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